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Abstract This paper investigated smoking status, including nicotine dependence, on the 
basis of four economic-psychological parameters. Two of them are rational addiction 
parameters—time preference rate and risk aversion coefficient—and the other two are 
bounded rational addiction parameters—time consistency index and risk consistency 
index. The time preference rate is positively associated with smoking probability, while 
the risk aversion coefficient is negatively associated with smoking probability. At the 
same time, the time and risk consistency indexes are negatively associated with 
smoking probability. Although economic-psychological parameters can account for 
smoking status on the whole, certain exceptions are found with regard to risk preference. 
These exceptions can be attributed to nicotine dependence. 
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Addiction has attracted considerable attention in health and behavioral economics, and 
economists have tried to understand addiction from the viewpoints of decision making 
over time and under risk (Chaloupka and Warner 2000). On the one hand, addiction can 
be interpreted as decision making over time, since consumers believe that an addictive 
product such as tobacco increases their current satisfaction, although it actually 
decreases future utility by damaging their health. On the other hand, addiction is 
decision making under risk because the future health damage is stochastic. This paper 
investigates smoking, the most common form of addiction, including nicotine 
dependence, on the basis of the time preference rate, risk aversion coefficient, 
discounted utility anomaly, and expected utility anomaly. 
  We now briefly describe smoking trends in Japan, where the percentage of smokers in 
the general population remains higher than those in other developed nations. In fact, the 
prevalence of smoking among people aged 20 years and over was around 26.3% in 2006, 
higher than the average figure of 24.0% among OECD countries. Although from 1990 
to 2006, the smoking prevalence for males dropped from 53.1% to 41.3%, for females, 
it actually increased from 9.4% to 12.4%. As in other countries, reduction of the 
smoking rate has been a central issue in public health policy. Healthy Japan 21, a 
program established by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, has promoted risk 
education, the eradication of smoking among teenagers, establishment of nonsmoking 
areas, and effective support for smoking cessation as its four main measures for tobacco 
control. Nevertheless, the factors that successfully account for smoking behavior remain 
undetermined. 
  There are two lines of research in the literature on addictive behaviors such as 
smoking: rational addiction models and bounded rational addiction models (Messinis 
1999). A model of the first type was advocated by Becker and Murphy (1988); in this 
model, utility maximizing consumers consider the future consequences of their past and 
current consumptions of addictive substances. The rational addiction model is thus 
compatible with such traditional economic models as the discounted and expected 
utility schemes. Considerable research on time preference has reported that smokers are 
more impatient than nonsmokers and more frequently choose earlier-smaller rewards 
over later-larger rewards. Examples of such studies include Mitchell (1999), Bickel et al. 
 3
(1999), Odum et al. (2002), Baker et al. (2003), Reynolds et al. (2003), and Ohmura et 
al. (2005). On the other hand, research on risk preference is not adequate enough to 
determine a link between smoking and risk-prone preferences. Thus, further research on 
this relationship is required. Another problem is that past studies measured the time 
preference rate and risk aversion coefficient separately when examining smoking from 
the economic and psychological perspective 2 . Ida and Goto (2009), however, 
simultaneously measured the time preference rate and risk aversion coefficient at the 
individual level using discrete choice experiments (DCE) and mixed logit (ML) model 
analysis. They found that smokers were more impatient and risk-prone than 
nonsmokers. 
  The second type of model is the bounded rational addiction model, an example of 
which is the model developed by Gruber and Koszegi (2001). In their model, the 
exponentially discounted and expected utility hypotheses were systematically violated: 
individuals neither recognized the true difficulty of quitting nor searched for self-control 
devices to help them quit. Gruber and Koszegi included strikingly different normative 
implications, since they suggested that government policy should consider not only the 
externalities imposed by smokers on others but also the internalities imposed by 
smokers on themselves (see also Winston 1980, Akerlof 1991, Kan 2007). 
  Are these two addiction models related? If so, are they complementary or substitutes? 
These questions will be investigated in this paper. Further, we need to verify whether an 
addict is both impatient and time-inconsistent and whether a risk-seeking smoker is 
likely to violate the expected utility hypothesis. Note that estimating smoking behavior 
separately based on either rational or bounded rational addiction model would cause an 
omitted variables bias. Very few studies, however, have focused on these aspects. One 
exception is Blondel et al. (2007), who compared the behavior of drug addicts with that 
of a control group and discovered that the decisions of the drug users, over time and 
under risk, were largely consistent with standard decision-making theories. Furthermore, 
they found no differences in the estimated discount rates between the drug users and the 
control group, although the former did appear to be more risk-seeking. These 
                                                 
2A few studies have integrated the measurements of time and risk preferences—for 
instance, Rachlin et al. (1991), Keren and Roelofsma (1995), Anderhub et al. (2001), 
and Yi et al. (2006). 
 4
conclusions are interesting, although the size of the sample was only 34. Expanding on 
Blondel et al. (2007), we draw a large population to examine the relation between the 
rationality and bounded rationality approaches in the context of smoking. 
  Next, we explain the two approaches for measuring the economic-psychological 
parameters adopted in this paper. First, we developed a simple method to 
simultaneously measure the rate of time preference and the coefficient of risk aversion. 
As Rachlin and Siegel (1994) suggest, the nature of the interaction between these 
parameters remains controversial because most previous studies measured them 
separately, which is analytically unsatisfactory. Accordingly, this paper simultaneously 
measures the rate of time preference and the coefficient of risk aversion at the 
individual level by following Ida and Goto (2009). Second, we elucidate how likely the 
stationality axioms, which are necessary for the discounted utility theory, and the 
independence axiom, which is necessary for the expected utility theory, are violated3. 
We refer to these anomalies the time consistency index and the risk consistency index, 
respectively. These indexes indicate the incidence rates of anomalies, where the indexes 
are normalized such that 0 indicates perfect inconsistency and 1, perfect consistency. 
We investigate whether the four economic-psychological parameters can successfully 
predict smoking status, including nicotine dependence. 
  Finally, this paper’s main conclusions can be summarized in two points. First, we 
analyze whether the economic-psychological parameters are associated with smoking. 
The analysis reveals that a 1% increase in the time preference rate significantly 
increases smoking probability by 0.7089%, while a 1% increase in the risk aversion 
coefficient significantly decreases smoking probability by 0.2031%. Furthermore, as 
expected, a 1% increase in the time consistency index decreases smoking probability by 
0.7497%, while the risk consistency index decreases smoking probability by 1.2606%. 
Second, we investigate how the economic-psychological parameters elucidate nicotine 
dependence. Our analysis shows that a 1% increase in the time preference rate 
                                                 
3A most interesting study related to this issue is Tanaka et al. (2009), who conducted 
experiments in Vietnamese villages to determine the predictors of risk and time 
preferences. They found that household income was correlated with patience but not 
with risk; in addition, they expanded measurements of risk and time preferences beyond 
expected utility and exponential discounting. 
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expectedly increases the nicotine dependence score by 0.1540%, but a 1% increase in 
the risk aversion coefficient increases the nicotine dependence score by 0.1013%, 
contrary to expectation. Furthermore, a 1% increase in the time consistency index 
expectedly decreases the nicotine dependence score by 0.5901%, and a 1% increase in 
the risk consistency index less intuitively increases the nicotine dependence score by 
0.4597%. Thus, we can see that the economic-psychological parameters function as 
good predictors of smoking status on the whole, although exceptions were discovered 
with regard to risk preference. These exceptions can be attributed to nicotine 
dependence. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the method of sampling data 
and discusses the characteristics of the sample. Section III proposes the discounted and 
expected utility models for estimating the economic-psychological parameters and 
illustrates an ML model analysis. Section IV explains the estimation models and their 
results, and Section V proposes four hypotheses and discusses the results. Section VI 
makes concluding remarks. 
 
 
II. Survey and Data 
 
This section explains the survey method and the data. In July 2008, we surveyed 435 
Japanese adults registered with a consumer monitoring investigative company4. Of them, 
253 were smokers and 182 were nonsmokers5. In terms of demographics, the ratio of 
female smokers was 36.4% and that of female nonsmokers was 56.6%. The average 
ages of smokers and nonsmokers were 40.5 and 35.3 years respectively. Similarly, 
38.7% of the smokers and 57.1% of the nonsmokers were university graduates, and the 
annual household incomes were JPY 5,950,593 (US$59,506, given JPY 100 = US$1) 
and JPY 6,052,198 (US$60,522) for smokers and for nonsmokers, respectively. 
                                                 
4The samples were adjusted to represent Japanese demographics for gender, average age, 
and geographical features. 
5 Around 250 smokers and nonsmokers were collected; the smokers included 
ex-smokers and never-smokers. The 59 ex-smokers were excluded from the sample in 
order to simplify the analysis. 
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 We defined nicotine dependence as follows. On the basis of the Fagerström Test for 
Nicotine Dependence (FTND), current smokers were classified as heavy (H), moderate 
(M), and light (L). FTND comprises the following six questions (Heatherton et al. 
1991). 
 
1. How soon after you wake up do you smoke your first cigarette? (1) Within 5 
minutes (3 points), (2) 6–30 minutes (2 points), (3) 31–60 minutes (1 point), (4) 
After 60 minutes (0 points) 
2. Do you find it difficult to refrain from smoking in places where it is forbidden, 
e.g., in church, at the library, at the cinema, etc.? (1) Yes (1 point), (2) No (0 
points) 
3. Which cigarette would you hate most to give up? (1) The first one in the 
morning (1 point), (2) All others (0 points) 
4. How many cigarettes do you smoke a day? (1) 10 or less (0 points), (2) 11–20 (1 
point), (3) 21–30 (2 points), (4) more than 30 (3 points) 
5. Do you smoke more frequently during the first hours after waking than during 
the rest of the day? (1) Yes (1 point), (2) No (0 points) 
6. Do you smoke even if you are so ill that you are in bed most of the day? (1) Yes 
(1 point), (2) No (0 points) 
 
  By aggregating the responses, we defined respondents with 0 to 3 points as having 
low nicotine dependence (L-smokers); 4 to 6 points, as moderate nicotine dependence 
(M-smokers); and 7 and above, as high nicotine dependence (H-smokers). We found 
that 38.3% of the respondents were L-smokers; 43.8%, M-smokers; and 17.8%, 
H-smokers. The female ratio is the highest for L-smokers, and the average age and ratio 
of university graduates are the lowest in the case of H-smokers. Further, the average 







III. Measuring Economic-psychological Parameters 
 
In this section, we explain the derivation of the economic-psychological parameters and 
show the estimation results. First, we used conjoint analysis to measure the time 
preference rate and risk aversion coefficient. Second, we conducted an experimental 
survey to check the discounted and expected utility anomalies. 
 
A. Time Preference and Risk Aversion Parameters 
 
The stated preference method (conjoint analysis) was used to simultaneously measure 
time and risk preferences for 435 valid respondents6. Conjoint analysis assumes that a 
service is a profile composed of attributes. If we include too many attributes and levels, 
respondents find it difficult to answer the questions. On the other hand, if we include 
too few, the description of the alternatives becomes inadequate. After conducting 
several pretests, we determined the following alternatives, attributes, and levels. 
 
Alternative 1 
Reward, probability, and delay are fixed across profiles. 
Reward: JPY 100,000 (US$1,000) 
Winning probability: 100% 
Time delay: None 
 
Alternative 2 
                                                 
6An advantage of simultaneously measuring the time preference rate and risk aversion 
coefficient is that the time preference rate can be identified without assuming a utility 
functional form (risk aversion coefficient) ad hoc. Andersen et al. (2008) argued that 
allowing for risk aversion leads to a significant difference in the elicited discount rates. 
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Reward, probability, and delay vary across profiles. 
Reward is either JPY 150,000 (US$1,500), 200,000 (US$2,000), 250,000 
(US$2,500), or 300,000 (US$3,000). 
The winning probability is 40, 60, 80, or 90%. 
The time delay is 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, or 5 years. 
 
  Since the number of profiles becomes unmanageable if we consider all possible 
combinations, we avoided this problem by adopting an orthogonal planning method. 





  Next, we explain the discounted and expected utility models that form the basis for 
estimating the time preference rates and risk aversion coefficients. Let the utility of 
alternative i be Vi (rewardi, probabilityi, timedelayi). The exponentially discounted 
utility model and the (linear in probability) expected utility model are used to derive the 
functional form of Vi as follows: 
 
Discounted utility: exp (–TIME * timedelayi) * utility (rewardi), 
where the parameter TIME denotes the rate of time preference. 
Expected utility7: probabilityi * utility (rewardi). 
 
  Accordingly, rewriting Vi, we obtain 
 
Vi (rewardi, probabilityi, timedelayi) 
= exp (–TIME * timedelayi) * probabilityi * utility (rewardi). 
 
  At this point, we simply specify the functional form of utility as the RISK-th power of 
                                                 
7If we consider index s as the state of nature (s = 1,…, S), the expected utility is written 
as Σ s = 1,…, S probabilitys * utility(rewards). Note that here we simply assume that one 
alternative has only one state of nature other than the state of zero reward. 
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reward. Such a utility function is called the constant relatively risk-averse form, where 
the coefficient of the relative risk aversion is denoted by 1-RISK. Taking the logarithms 
of both sides, we obtain 
 
ln Vi (rewardi, probabilityi, timedelayi) 
= –TIME * timedelayi + ln probabilityi + RISK * ln rewardi. 
 
  Two points should be noted here: first, a greater level of impatience implies a larger 
TIME; second, since a risk-averse attitude is denoted by 1-RISK ∈ [0,1], a greater 
level of risk aversion implies a larger value of 1-RISK. 
  Finally, we explain the estimation models. Conditional logit (CL) models, which 
assume independent and identical distribution (IID) of random terms, have been widely 
used in past studies. However, the property of independence from the irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA), derived from the IID assumption of the CL model, is too strict to 
allow flexible substitution patterns. The most appropriate scheme is an ML model that 
accommodates differences in the variance of random components (or unobserved 
heterogeneity). These models are flexible enough to overcome the limitations of CL 
models by allowing random taste variation, unrestricted substitution patterns, and the 
correlation of random terms over time (McFadden and Train 2000). See the APPENDIX 
for details of the ML models. 
  In what follows, we assume that the preference parameters regarding time and risk 
follow normal distribution. 
 
TIME (rate of time preference) 
RISK (coefficient of relative risk aversion represented by 1-RISK). 
 
  We can demonstrate variety in the parameters at the individual level using the 
maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) method for estimation by setting 100 Halton 
draws8. Furthermore, as the respondents answered eight questions as part of the conjoint 
                                                 
8The adoption of the Halton sequence draw is an important issue to be examined 
(Halton 1960). Bhat (2001) found that 100 Halton sequence draws are more efficient 
than 1,000 random draws for simulating an ML model. 
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analysis, the resultant data form a panel that offers the option of applying standard 
random effect estimation. We can now calculate the estimator of the conditional mean 
of the random parameters at the individual level. 
  Table 2 summarizes the measurement results of the time preference rate and risk 
aversion coefficient, where the values represent the means and standard errors. The 
measured time preference rates (monthly) are 7.0% for smokers and 5.1% for 
nonsmokers, which is consistent with Ida and Goto (2009). The t value with respect to 
the difference in both figures is 140.3 and thus, is highly significant. The detailed results 
for smokers are as follows: 5.6% for L-smokers, 7.7% for M-smokers, and 8.2% for 
H-smokers, indicating that higher nicotine dependence is associated with more myopic 
preference. The t values with respect to the differences in these figures are 67.3 between 
L- and M-smokers, 27.3 between L- and H-smokers, and 5.1 between M- and 
H-smokers. All the results are highly significant. 
  Next, the measured risk aversion coefficients are 3.9% for smokers and 10.7% for 
nonsmokers, which is also consistent with Ida and Goto (2009). The t value with respect 
to the difference in both figures is 51.3 and thus, is highly significant. The detailed 
results for smokers are as follows: 5.6% for L-smokers, 4.2% for M-smokers, and 
–0.8% for H-smokers, indicating that higher nicotine dependence is associated with less 
risk-averse preference. Note that the heaviest smokers are classified as risk-prone. The t 
values for the differences in these figures are 3.3 between L- and M-smokers, 20.4 
between L- and H-smokers, and 11.6 between M- and H-smokers. All these results are 




B. Discounted and Expected Utility Anomalies 
 
Next, we address two anomalies. First, we explain the discounted utility anomaly. The 
standard theory of decision making over time is the exponentially discounted utility 
model, whose key assumption is a stationality axiom. This implies that if and only if the 
utility of JPY 100,000 at present is independent of the utility of JPY 150,000 in one year, 
then the utility of JPY 100,000 in ten years is independent of the utility of JPY 150,000 
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in eleven years. 
  Given that X and Y denote payoffs (X < Y) and t and s denote time delay (t < s), 
stationality is more formally defined as follows: 
 
(X,t) ≥  (Y,s) ⇔  (X,t+ε) ≥  (Y,s+ε). 
Note that ε is a positive constant. 
 
  At this point, the discounted utility model demonstrates U(X)/(1 + r)t ≥  U(Y)/(1 + 
r)s for t and s9. However, the discounted utility anomaly of a present-smaller reward 
being excessively preferred to a delayed-larger reward indicates the following 
inconsistent preference orders: 
 
 (X,t) ≥  (Y,s) ⇔  (X,t + ε) ≤  (Y,s + ε). 
 
This anomaly is called time inconsistency (Strotz 1956) 10, which is interestingly 
observed even in the case of animals, including pigeons (Ainslie 1975).  




Alternative 1: Receive JPY 100,000 (US$1,000) immediately. 
Alternative 2: Receive JPY 150,000 (US$1,500) in X years. 
What X makes the two alternatives independent? 
 
Question 2 
Alternative 1: Receive JPY 100,000 (US$1,000) in one year. 
Alternative 2: Receive JPY 150,000 (US$1,500) in Y years. 
What Y makes the two alternatives independent? 
                                                 
9For continuous time, the exponentially discounted utility model is represented by 
exp(-rt)U(X) ≥  exp(-rs)U(Y). 
10A model considers a decreasing discount rate as hyperbolically discounting, which is 
represented by U(X)/ (1+ t)r . 
 12
 
  On the basis of the exponentially discounted utility model, when the utility of JPY 
100,000 at present equals the utility of JPY 150,000 in X years, we obtain the following 
equation: 
 
Utility of JPY 100,000 = Utility of JPY 150,000/(1 + r)X. 
Note that r denotes the annual time preference rate. 
 
  On the other hand, when the utility of JPY 100,000 in one year equals the utility of 
JPY 150,000 in Y years, we obtain the following equation: 
 
Utility of JPY 100,000 /(1 + s) = Utility of JPY 150,000 /(1 + s)Y. 
 
If the time preference rate is constant (r = s), as the exponentially discounted utility 
model assumes, then X/(Y – 1) = 1 holds. However, discounted utility anomaly X/(Y – 1) 
< 1 is frequently observed, so the time preference rate decreases for time delay (r > s). 
The main reason for this is the immediacy effect, wherein people tend to lay more 
emphasis on an immediate reward as opposed to a delayed one (Fredrick et al. 2000). In 
Question 1, since Alternative 1 includes an immediate reward, Alternative 2 requires 
that X be a relatively small figure (for example, one year). On the other hand, in 
Question 2, since Alternative 1 includes a one-year-delayed reward, Alternative 2 
requires that Y be a large figure (for example, three years). The time consistency index 
is defined as X/(Y – 1). X/(Y – 1) = 1 indicates perfect consistency, while X/(Y – 1) = 0 
indicates perfect inconsistency. It follows that X/(Y – 1) = 0.5 for the example above. 
  Next, we explain the expected utility anomaly, whose key assumption is the 
independence axiom. If lottery X is preferred to lottery Y, mixing lotteries X and Y with 
irrelevant third lotteries W and Z with common probability 1 – P preserves the 
preference orders: 
 
(X, P; Z, 1 – P) > (Y, P; Z, 1 – P) ⇔  (X, P; W, 1 – P) > (Y, P; W, 1 – P). 
 





Alternative 1: Receive a guaranteed JPY 100,000 (US$1,000). 
Alternative 2: Receive JPY 200,000 (US$2,000) at X%. 
What X makes the two alternatives independent? 
 
Question 2 
Alternative 1: Receive JPY 100,000 (US$1,000) at 50%. 
Alternative 2: Receive JPY 200,000 (US$2,000) at Y%. 
What Y makes the two alternatives independent? 
 
  On the basis of the expected utility model, when the utility of JPY 100,000 at 100% 
equals the utility of JPY 200,000 at X%, we obtain the following equation: 
 
Utility of JPY 100,000 = X/100 ×  Utility of JPY 200,000. 
  
  The preference between Alternatives 1 and 2 is preserved when dividing them by a 
common ratio. For example, when the utility of JPY 100,000 at 50% equals the utility of 
JPY 200,000 at Y%, we obtain the relationship 2Y/ X = 1. However, the expected utility 
anomaly 2Y/X < 1 is frequently observed. This is called the common ratio anomaly or 
the violation of the independence axiom (Allais 1953). The main reason for this is the 
certainty effect, whereby people markedly prefer an assured reward in comparison to a 
risky reward (Starmer 2000). In Question 1, since Alternative 1 is a certain reward, 
Alternative 2 requires that X be of a relatively large value (for example, 0.8). On the 
other hand, in Question 2, since Alternative 1 includes a risk (with probability 0.5), 
Alternative 2 requires that Y be of a small value (for example, 0.3). The risk consistency 
index is defined as 2Y/X. 2Y/X = 1 indicates perfect consistency, while 2Y/X = 0 
indicates perfect inconsistency. It follows that 2Y/X = 0.75 for the example above. 
  Table 2 also summarizes the measurement results of the time and risk consistency 
indexes, where the values represent the means and standard errors. The measured time 
consistency indexes are 0.7971 for smokers and 0.8375 for nonsmokers, which indicates 
that nonsmokers are more consistent with the discounted utility anomaly hypothesis 
than smokers. The t value for the difference in both figures is 21.3 and thus, is highly 
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significant. The detailed results for smokers are as follows: 0.8196 for L-smokers, 
0.8070 for M-smokers, and 0.7241 for H-smokers, indicating that heavier nicotine 
dependence is associated with less consistent time preference. The t values with respect 
to the differences in these figures are 3.2 between L- and M-smokers, 12.3 between L- 
and H-smokers, and 10.8 between M- and H-smokers. All these results are highly 
significant. 
  Next, the measured risk consistency indexes are 0.8756 for smokers and 0.8905 for 
nonsmokers, which indicates that nonsmokers are more consistent with the expected 
utility anomaly hypothesis than smokers. The t value for the difference in both figures is 
13.5 and thus, is highly significant. The detailed results for smokers are as follows: 
0.8681 for L-smokers, 0.8667 for M-smokers, and 0.9137 for H-smokers. Therefore, we 
do not observe an intuitively plausible relationship between nicotine dependence and 
the risk consistency index, since, contrary to our expectation, the heaviest smokers have 
the most consistent risk preferences. The t values for the differences in these figures are 
0.6 between L- and M-smokers, 13.0 between L- and H-smokers, and 13.7 between M- 
and H-smokers. Not all of these results are significant. Risk anomaly can perhaps be 
attributed to the certainty effect and be interpreted as loss aversion. It remains unclear 
why risk preference appears to be more complicated than time preference. 
 
 
IV. Estimation Model and Results 
 
In this section, we explain the ordered probit model with a sample selection equation 
and then discuss the estimation results. 
 
A. Estimation Model 
 
We begin by explaining the estimation model that we adopted. The decision to smoke 
can be decomposed into two steps. First, one simply decides whether to smoke. Next, 
one decides how much to smoke, namely, the nicotine dependence. This two-step 
decision is considered an ordered probit model (whose FTND scores range from 0 to 
10) with a binomial probit model (where smoking is denoted as 1 and 0 otherwise). Let 
us now comment on the ordered probit model with the sample selection equation. 
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* = α 'Zi + ui ,
di = 1 if di* > 0 and 0 otherwise.
   (1) 
 





* = β 'Xi + εi , εi : F(εi |θ), E[εi ] = 0, Var[εi ] = 1,
yi = 0 if yi* ≤ μ0 ,
= 1 if μ0 ≤ yi* ≤ μ1,
L
= 10 if μ9 ≤ yi*.
 (2) 
 
  The system [yi , Xi ]  is observable if and only if di = 1 holds. Selectivity matters if 
ρ  is not equal to zero: 
 
  [εi ,ui ] : N[0,0,1,1,ρ].    (3) 
 
  The full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method is used for estimating the 
parameters, including ρ . 
  The explained variables are given as follows: in the binomial model, the dummy 
variable is 1 for smoking and 0 otherwise; in the ordered probit model, the FTND score 
ranges from 0 (lowest nicotine dependence) to 10 (highest). 
  The explanatory variables are given as follows. First, the individual characteristic 
variables are female dummy variable (GENDER = 0 for male, 1 for female), age (AGE), 
school history (SCHOOL = 1 for junior high school, 2 for high school, 3 for university, 
and 4 for graduate school), and annual household income level (INCOME = 1 for very 
low, 2 for low, 3 for lower middle, 4 for upper middle, 5 for high, and 6 for very high). 
  Next, the following are the economic-psychological parameters that were previously 
introduced: rate of time preference (TIME), coefficient of risk aversion (1-RISK), time 
consistency index (TIME CONSISTENCY), risk consistency index (RISK 
CONSISTENCY), interaction term of TIME and TIME CONSISTENCY, and 
interaction term of 1-RISK and RISK CONSISTENCY. 
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B. Estimation Results 
 
  We begin our discussion of the estimation results, which are shown in Table 3, with 
the results of the binomial probit model. Female dummy and school history are 
negatively associated with smoking probability, while age is positively associated. 
Further, annual household income does not influence smoking probability. The time 
preference rate does not have a significant impact on smoking probability, but the risk 
aversion coefficient has a positive influence. Similarly, the time consistency index is 
negatively related with smoking probability, while the risk consistency index is not 
related. Finally, the interaction term of the time preference rate and the time consistency 
index positively impacts smoking probability, while the interaction term of the risk 
aversion coefficient and the risk consistency index has a negative impact. We will 
analyze the comprehensive effects of the economic-psychological parameters on 
smoking probability by considering the interaction terms in the next section. 
  We now turn to the results of the ordered probit model. Female dummy and school 
history are negatively associated with nicotine dependence, while age is positively 
associated. Further, annual household income does not influence nicotine dependence. 
The time preference rate does not significantly impact nicotine dependence, but the risk 
aversion coefficient negatively influences nicotine dependence. Similarly, the time 
consistency index is not significantly related to nicotine dependence, while the risk 
consistency index is negatively related. Finally, the interaction term of the time 
preference rate and the time consistency index positively impacts nicotine dependence, 
and that of the risk aversion coefficient and the risk consistency index has the same 
impact. In the next section, we will analyze the comprehensive effects of the 
economic-psychological parameters on nicotine dependence by taking the interaction 
terms into consideration. 
  In addition, since the correlation between the two error terms is not statistically 
significant, we cannot conclude that selectivity matters. Thus, we can even choose to 








In this section, we investigate the comprehensive effects of such 
economic-psychological parameters as the time preference rate, risk aversion coefficient, 
time consistency index, and risk consistency index on the decision to smoke and 
nicotine dependence. 
  The elasticities of smoking probability for these parameters are displayed in Table 4. 
Note that the elasticities are measured around the mean values. The first hypothesis is 
established with respect to the elasticities of smoking probability with the time 




Hypothesis 1: time preference rate, risk aversion coefficient, and smoking probability 
The higher the time preference rate, the higher is the smoking probability. On the 
other hand, the higher the risk aversion coefficient, the lower is the smoking 
probability. 
 
  We tested the above hypothesis by considering the main effects and the interaction 
terms, and obtained the following result. 
 
Result 1: Hypothesis 1 is verified. 
A 1% increase in the time preference rate significantly increased smoking probability 
by 0.7089%. Further, a 1% increase in the risk aversion coefficient significantly 
decreased smoking probability by 0.2031%. 
 
  Attitudes toward smoking are ambiguous as they involve considerations such as 
current stress relief and future health damage. This explains the positive correlation 
between time preference rate and smoking probability. Besides, it is reasonable that 
those who practice risk aversion avoid smoking because it is widely known to increase 
health risks. Our finding that smokers are more impatient than nonsmokers with regard 
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to delay discounting is consistent with previous research (Mitchell 1999, Bickel et al. 
1999, Odum et al. 2002, Baker et al. 2003, Reynolds et al. 2004, Ohmura et al. 2005). 
On the other hand, although many studies have investigated the relationship between 
smoking and attitudes toward risk, the issue remains inconclusive (Mitchell 1999, 
Reynolds et al. 2003, Ohmura et al. 2005). Our simultaneous measurements of the time 
preference rate and risk aversion coefficient indicate that smokers are more 
time-impatient and more risk-prone than nonsmokers. 
  At this point, a reservation must be mentioned. Since this research only investigated 
the relationship between smoking and time/risk preferences, we reserve judgment about 
causality because we cannot determine whether an impulsive person tends to smoke or 
whether a smoker tends to become impulsive. A detailed study of causality lies outside 
the scope of this paper. This is the most crucial area for future research11. 
  The second hypothesis is established for the elasticities of smoking probability with 
time and risk consistency indexes. 
 
Hypothesis 2: time anomaly, risk anomaly, and smoking probability 
The higher the time consistency index, the lower is the smoking probability. Similarly, 
the higher the risk consistency index, the lower is the smoking probability. 
 
  We obtained the following result. 
 
Result 2: Hypothesis 2 is verified. 
A 1% increase in the time consistency index significantly decreased the smoking 
probability by 0.7497%. Moreover, a 1% increase in the risk consistency index 
significantly decreased the smoking probability by 1.2606%. 
 
  Therefore, both the time and risk consistency indexes successfully account for 
                                                 
11Becker and Mulligan (1997) and Orphanides and Zervos (1998) suggested a variant of 
the rational addiction approach where the time preference rate was endogenously 
generated. On the other hand, Loewenstein et al. (2003) pointed out the projection bias, 
which suggests that a person was wrongly convinced that her/his current preference 
would last for a long period. 
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smoking decisions. Note that the impact of the risk consistency index is larger than that 
of the time consistency index. If we suppose that smoking results from anomalies of the 
discounted or expected utility models, higher consistency naturally leads to lower 
smoking probability. Several studies have regarded addiction as time-inconsistent 
behavior. For example, Gruber and Koszegi (2001) demonstrated that individuals failed 
to recognize the true difficulty of quitting and sought self-control devices to help them 
quit. Kan (2007) empirically studied time-inconsistent preferences in the context of 
cigarette smoking behavior and concluded that a smoker who wanted to quit had a 
demand for control devices, e.g., smoking bans in public areas or hikes in cigarette 
taxes. 
  Next, the elasticities of nicotine dependence with respect to economic-psychological 
parameters are displayed in Table 5. A third hypothesis is established about the 





Hypothesis 3: time preference rate, risk aversion coefficient, and nicotine dependence 
The higher the time preference rate, the higher is the nicotine dependence. On the 
other hand, the higher the risk aversion coefficient, the lower is the nicotine 
dependence. 
 
  We tested the above hypothesis by considering the main effects and interaction terms, 
and obtained the following result. 
 
Result 3: Hypothesis 3 is confirmed only for the time preference rate. 
A 1% increase in the time preference rate significantly increased the FTND score by 
0.1540%. On the other hand, contrary to our expectation, a 1% increase in the risk 
aversion coefficient increased the FTND score by 0.1013%. 
 
  As such, only the time preference rate accounts for nicotine dependence, which is 
consistent with the findings of previous research. For example, Reynolds et al. (2004) 
reported a significant positive correlation between the number of cigarettes smoked 
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daily and the time preference rate, and Ohmura et al. (2005) suggested that both the 
frequency of nicotine self-administration as well as the dosage were positively 
associated with greater delay discounting. On the other hand, the risk aversion 
coefficient is unexpectedly positively associated with nicotine dependence. Note that 
Mitchell (1999), Reynolds et al. (2003), and Ohmura et al. (2005) reported negligible 
correlations between smoking and risk-prone preferences. The reason why the results of 
risk preference appear to be so complicated in comparison with those obtained from 
time preference remains unclear. 
    The fourth hypothesis is established for the elasticities of nicotine dependence with 
time and risk consistency indexes. 
 
Hypothesis 4: time anomaly, risk anomaly, and nicotine dependence 
The higher the time consistency index, the lower is the nicotine dependence. 
Similarly, the higher the risk consistency index, the lower is the nicotine dependence. 
 
  We obtained the following result. 
 
Result 4: Hypothesis 3 is confirmed only for the time consistency index. 
A 1% increase in the time consistency index significantly decreased the FTND score 
by 0.5901%. On the other hand, contrary to our expectation, a 1% increase in the risk 
consistency index increased the FTND score by 0.4597%. 
 
  Only the time consistency index successfully accounts for nicotine dependence; this 
finding is consistent with previous research. For example, Gruber and Koszegi (2001) 
developed a new model of time inconsistency and argued that government policy should 
consider not only the externalities that smokers imposed on others but also the 
internalities imposed by smokers on themselves. In this context, we can consider the 
concept of libertarian paternalism advocated by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). They insist 
that with bounded rationality, it is preferable to maintain freedom of choice on the one 
hand, as well as to design private and public institutions for improving people’s welfare 
on the other hand. 
  Next, the risk consistency index, like the risk aversion coefficient, is unexpectedly 
positively associated with nicotine dependence. Interestingly, our result is connected 
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with Yi et al. (2006), who compared smokers and nonsmokers using a probability 
discounting procedure. When these data were fit to a hyperbolic discounting model, 
significant group differences were not observed; further, indifference points obtained 
from high probabilities were lower for heavy cigarette smokers as compared to 
nonsmokers. 
  In conclusion, both the time preference rate and the time consistency index can 
suitably account for smoking and nicotine dependence. On the other hand, the risk 
aversion coefficient and the risk consistency index only predict the decision to smoke, 
not nicotine dependence. This partial discrepancy between time and risk preferences 
suggests that they share certain common elements with regard to the decision to smoke 





This paper investigated smoking status, including nicotine dependence, on the basis of 
four economic-psychological parameters. Two of them are rational addiction 
parameters—time preference rate and risk aversion coefficient—while the other two are 
the time consistency index and risk consistency index. First, when analyzing whether 
economic-psychological parameters are associated with smoking, it was found that the 
time preference rate significantly increased smoking probability; on the other hand, the 
risk aversion coefficient significantly decreased smoking probability. Furthermore, the 
higher the time consistency index, the lower is the smoking probability, and the higher 
the risk consistency index, the lower is the smoking probability. Second, when 
investigating how economic-psychological parameters can elucidate nicotine 
dependence, we discovered unexpected results: the risk aversion coefficient and the risk 
consistency index are positively associated with nicotine dependence. Thus, it becomes 
clear that economic-psychological parameters function as good predictors of smoking 
status on the whole, although exceptions were discovered with regard to risk preference. 
These exceptions can be attributed to nicotine dependence. 
  The above results mark a breakthrough in smoking research. However, some 
unsolved problems remain. Since this research only investigated the relationship 
between smoking and time/risk preferences, we reserve judgment about causality 
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because we cannot determine whether an impulsive person tends to smoke or whether a 
smoker tends to become impulsive. A detailed study of causality lies outside the scope 
of this paper. However, this area is crucial for future research. Furthermore, we assumed 
that delay and risk were distinguished by our questionnaires. However, the literature, 
including Rachlin et al. (1991) and Sozou (1998), demonstrated that both risk and delay 
of reward elicited the same underlying form of intolerance, because the value of a future 
reward should be discounted such that there exists a risk that the reward will not be 
realized. On the other hand, other studies such as Green and Myerson (2004) have 
shown that both time and probability discounting are different and dissociable processes. 
We consider these issues as potential topics for future research. 
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APPENDIX ML Model 
 
Assuming that parameter  βn  is distributed with density function f (βn )  (Train 2003, 
Louviere et al. 2000), the ML specification allows for repeated choices by each sampled 
decision maker in such a way that the coefficients vary over people but are constant 
over choice situations for each person. The logit probability of decision maker n 
choosing alternative i in choice situation t is expressed as 
Lnit (βn ) = [exp(Vnit (βn )) / exp(Vnjt (βn ))j=1
J∑ ]t=1T∏ , 
which is the product of normal logit formulas, given parameterβn , the observable 
portion of utility function Vnit , and alternatives j=1, …, J in choice situations t = 1, …, T. 
Therefore, ML choice probability is a weighted average of logit probability  Lnit (βn )  
evaluated at parameter  βn  with density function f (βn ) , which can be written as 
 
Pnit = Lnit (βn ) f (βn )d∫ βn . 
  In the linear-in-parameter form, the utility function can be written as 
 Unit = γ ' xnit + βn ' znit + εnit , 
where  xnit  and  znit  denote observable variables, γ denotes a fixed parameter vector, 
 βn denotes a random parameter vector, and εnit  denotes an independently and 
identically distributed extreme value (IIDEV) term. 
  Since ML choice probability is not expressed in closed form, simulations need to be 
performed for the ML model estimation (see Train 2003, p. 148 for details). We can also 
calculate the estimator of the conditional mean of the random parameters, conditioned 
on individual specific choice profile yn , given as 
h(β | yn ) = [P( yn | β) f (β)] / P( yn | β) f (β)dβ∫ . 
  Here, we assume that preference parameters regarding time and risk follow normal 
distribution: 
TIME (rate of time preference) 
RISK (coefficient of relative risk aversion represented by 1-RISK). 
  The random utility that person n obtains from choosing alternative i in choice 
situation t can be written as follows: 
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 Unit = −α *TIME * timedelaynit +α * ln probabilitynit +α * RISK * ln rewardnit + εnit ,  
where is a scale parameter that is not separately identified from free parameters and is 
normalized to one (Hensher, Rose, and Green 2005, p. 536)12. 
                                                 
12 Louviere, Hensher, and Swait (2000, pp. 142–143) showed that variance is an inverse 
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TABLE 1: Basic Demographics 
 
 





NON-SMOKER 182 0.5659 35.26 0.5714 6,052,198
SMOKER 253 0.3636 40.48 0.3874 5,950,593
L-SMOKER 97 0.4845 38.30 0.3918 5,737,113
M-SMOKER 111 0.3151 40.86 0.3964 6,301,802
H-SMOKER 45 0.2222 44.22 0.3556 5,544,444
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FIG. 1: Representative questionnaire 
 
  ALTERNATIVE 1 ALTERNATIVE 2 
REWARD  JPY 100,000 JPY 250,000 
TIME DELAY  NOW 1 MONTH LATER 
WINNING PROBABILITY  100% 80% 
  ↓  ↓ 




TABLE 2: Time Preference Rates, Risk Aversion Coefficients, Time Anomaly Indices, 






MEAN 0.0505 0.1069 0.8375 0.8905
S.E. 0.0009 0.0091 0.0201 0.0120
MEAN 0.0697 0.0385 0.7971 0.8756
S.E. 0.0019 0.0183 0.0187 0.0104
MEAN 0.0555 0.0557 0.8196 0.8681
S.E. 0.0019 0.0191 0.0279 0.0168
MEAN 0.0771 0.0423 0.8070 0.8667
S.E. 0.0027 0.0376 0.0286 0.0166
MEAN 0.0821 -0.0079 0.7241 0.9137







TABLE 3: Estimation Results 
 






GENDER -0.60959 0.18182 ***
AGE 0.01370 0.00714 *
SCHOOL -0.15282 0.06274 **
INCOME 0.01087 0.06078
TIME -7.48861 4.74093
1-RISK 9.63221 4.68444 **
TIME CONSISTENCY -1.71441 0.44788 ***
RISK CONSISTENCY 1.20829 0.82424
TIME*(TIME CONSISTENCY) 21.19997 5.87867 ***
(1-RISK)*(RISK CONSISTENCY) -9.82897 4.73522 **
ORDERED PROBIT MODEL
CONSTANT 1.19453 0.73867
GENDER -0.57642 0.14542 ***
AGE 0.01921 0.00581 ***
SCHOOL -0.22632 0.05315 ***
INCOME -0.04187 0.05645
TIME -1.09825 7.40304
1-RISK -8.62954 2.41216 ***
TIME CONSISTENCY -1.04281 0.67158
RISK CONSISTENCY -1.52671 0.44624 ***
TIME*(TIME CONSISTENCY) 21.08610 11.04321 *





TABLE 4: Probabilities Elasticities for Binomial Probit Model 
 
Note: *** 1% significant level, ** 5% significant level 
 
Elasticity S.E.
TIME 0.7089 0.1420 ***
1-RISK -0.2031 0.0605 ***
TIME CONSISTENCY -0.7497 0.3364 **
RISK CONSISTENCY -1.2606 0.3553 ***
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TABLE 5: FTND Elasticities for Ordered Probit Model 
 





TIME 0.1540 0.0534 ***
1-RISK 0.1013 0.0211 ***
TIME CONSISTENCY -0.5901 0.1958 ***
RISK CONSISTENCY 0.4597 0.0807 ***
